黃色小雞: 3月 2011

This is an unfinished paper that I have written last year, I used to think I should try publishing it, but, it seems like highly unlikely considering, no one is going to review the article for me.

ABSTRACT.

The aim of this paper is to show that Clayton’s ‘Emergent Monism’ is seriously flawed and is not a third option for the mind/body problem. First, I shall argue Clayton’s methodology is problematic, his inductive proofs for top down causation is circular; second, his metaphysical position (Emergent Monism) starts from a misinterpretation of Physicalism; due to the confusion, Clayton has given up the causal closure of physical with false grounds, so, he is unaware that Emergent Monism (EM) is a token of Non-Reductive Physicalism (NRR) and it’s thesis on top down causation is blocked by Kim Jaegwon’s Supervenience Argument. Last, I shall conclude that EM does not solve the problem of mind/body problem.

1. Introduction

The mind/body problem, the problem that argues how minds (whether a physical or non-physical mind) can cause actions on physical bodies, has caught many attentions among scholars on Philosophy of Mind since the last three decades of the past century. The arena of the debate has mainly rested on two types of Physicalism, Reductive Physicalism (RP) that believes there are bridge laws linking mentality to fundamental Physics and Non-Reductive Physicalism (NRP) that believes mentality are irreducible through thesis like multiple realization and the irreducible qualitative experiences. At the same time, Substance Dualism (SD), which believes in the existence and causal power of non-physical substances, though, having a hard time in reconciling with the scientific studies, remains as the most visible option for scholars who deny Physicalism. Discontent with both the positions, theologian Philip Clayton, after observing the new discoveries from scientific researches on Evolutionary Biology, has recently articulated a view, Emergent Monism (EM) as a third response to the problem. For Clayton, the novel emergences in natural science through the history of evolution are counter-examples against the ‘unity of science’, that simply refers to the hope of reducing all special sciences to fundamental Physics.[1] Furthermore, Clayton believes in a form of strong emergence, which presupposes that:

1. There are downward causations among different level of emergence.

2. Mind as one of the emergence level which is causally efficacious.[2]

So for Clayton, as he himself has suggested, explaining the influence of mental events is dynamic to the quest of such a theory.[3] However, methodologically speaking, most of his evidence for top down causations (mental causation) are inconclusive; worse, due to some misinterpretation to physicalism, Clayton is unaware that EM should be categorized as a token of NRP and so fall under Kim’s Supervenience Argument that has been read as one of the most strong arguments against NRP and mental causation in contemporary literature of Philosophy of Mind. So to make sense of Emergent Monism, Clayton has to first be realistic about his project, by providing proofs and explanations for downward causation and mental causations, rather than, as J. P. Moreland has suggested, an extreme shop-listing approach that simply rejected every thesis that stand against EM.[4] For these reasons, I shall further conclude that EM is not a third option for the mind/body problem.

2. Philip Clayton’s Emergent Monism

In contemporary literature, Emergentism can either be weak or strong, Weak Emergentism believes that emergence refers to events that knowing the details of a lower-level cannot predicted how a higher-level emerges, while the causations remain bottom up, the properties of higher-level is either dependent, determine or supervenience on the lower level; Strong Emergence goes one step further, arguing that high-level properties/events exhibit top down causations, which means the emergent properties are causally influencing.[5] For instance, suppose consciousness is a higher emergent scientific level of the brain or the nervous system, Weak Emergentists suggests the emerges of Consciousness is unpredictable even with a detail understanding of Neuron-Biology, yet the property (being conscious) can be completely epiphenomenal; while for Strong Emergentists, Consciousness can be casually efficacious if it exhibits top down causation.[6]

According to Clayton. Emergent Monism advocates eight theses that distinct from both Physicalism and Substance Dualism:

1. Monism: the world is made up of one substance, which is much broader than our understanding from Physics.

2. Hierarchical complexity: simple parts become complicate whole, while the whole become a part and so on and so forth.

3. Temporal: the hierarchical structuring takes places over time.

4. No monolithic law of emergence: emergence is contingent, there are no strict law governing them.

5. Pattern across levels of emergence: the universe has many levels, the emergence of new levels is contingent, and new levels are dependent yet does not reducible to the lower level.

6. Downward Causation: emergent properties/objects are causally efficacious.

7. Pluralism: emergence is neither dualistic nor monolithic.

8. Mind as emergent: Minds are casually efficacious.[7]

EM is then a position that argues, due to the limitation of Physicalism that believes in the reduction or physics[8], during the history of evolution, a lot of unpredicted, irreducible levels have emerged, which each of them might exercise top down causation, a causation that, “the process whereby some whole has an active non-additive causal influence on its parts.”[9] Furthermore, the human mind is one of the many emergent higher levels since the long evolutionary history from the Big Bang.

I accept thesis 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. these theses only implies Weak Emergence and I agree in Clayton’s work, especially Mind & Emergence and Re-Emergence of Emergence, he and different scholars have provided apt examples in the natural science that emergences have been happening. However, I do not believe we can take theses 1, 6 and 8 without reserves. For, it is the line that divides Weak Emergence from Strong Emergence, a metaphysical position that advocate bottom up causations from top down causations, the position that shape our perspectives on how scientific researches should be conducted.

Put things otherwise, I believe the success and failure of Clayton’s Emergent Monism rest upon the success and failure in explaining how different kinds of monolithic substances, especially mental phenomenal like consciousness can express top down causation. It is because EM’s first goal is to response to the mind/body problem, discussing how human beings who exhibit emergent properties are causal agents in the fundamentally physical world.[10] I shall argue, nonetheless, he has failed, since EM is unable to explain how top down causation is possible, both methodologically and metaphysically. If EM cannot explain the causal power of mentality, EM fails, it does not answer the mind/body problem, not to mention his further agenda in arguing the possibility of divine action in the monolithic physical world from EM.

3. Arguments for top down Causation

Has Clayton provided evidence for top down causation? If we believe Clayton share the burden of proof in defending the notion on top down causation, he has not successfully explaining and proving the notion of it; it is because, rather than arguing the validity of top down causation, Clayton has just shown us what have been happening in the biological domain and move on, concluding these emergent objects/properties express top down causation,[11] Moreland has criticized this methodology nicely , he said,

Clayton’s confusion (in explaining top down causation) is evidenced by the fact that he actually claims to provide an argument for top/down causation by merely offering a definition of levels that include by fiat the notion of top/down causation.

According to Clayton, top down causation is defined as:

Top down causation: the process whereby some whole has an active non-additive causal influence on its parts.[12]

Clayton believes top down causation is a kind of radical emergence (Strong Emergence), the property of being casual efficacious is not a micro-physics base properties and unpredictably emerge from the lower level with “special” causal influences. For instance, if we suppose consciousness exhibit top down causation, it means consciousness emerges from the brain, yet none of the micro-physical properties of the brain can constitute the causal power of the macro-physical mental power.

Most of Clayton’s proofs on emergences can be found in chapter 3 of his work, Mind & Emergence. The examples he has used, for instance the complex system of Bio-Chemistry, artificial systems and Biology in the fast half of the chapters, only suggests Weak Emergence, the belief that emergence in the natural science is just a result of epistemic limitation.[13] In these examples, Clayton has tried to demonstrate that reduction is impossible in natural science, especially in the biological sphere, so Weak/Strong Emergence is a better ontological position in conducting researches, for, considering many systems, especially biological systems are too complicated and novel to predict the outcome, which some of them might even be non-linear or holistic, one can only conclude the novel events as emergence and explain the events at a higher level.[14]

Seeking light from Systems Biology and Evolutionary Biology, Clayton believed, “Understanding complex cellular and intercellular behavior … I will suggest, crucial insights into the role of downward causation in nature.”[15] However, he has not fulfilled his promise, he has not provided any insights that argues how there is a role of downward causation in nature. On the contrary, he has just shown us what have been happening in natural science, for example, “When the complex topology of networks is mapped and modeled on computers, analysis of the network models reveals scale-free properties.”[16] And concluding the findings from biological selections, “DNA, strands, cell… These in term become agents, carrying out complicated behaviors in interaction with their environments”[17] Then in conclusion of the chapter he just simply remarks, the existence of top down causation is visible.[18]

The problem here is: barely citing what have been happening in the biological domain does not justify the thesis on top down causation, for two reasons. Firstly, it is obvious that Claytons’ proving is circular. Existence of top down causation is proved by the existence of biological events that exhibit whole to part causation, which whole to part causation is the definition of top down causation; thus, there exist top down causation. The notion of top down causation, as we have to agree, is very controversial, but Clayton seems unable to prove the existence of the thesis. Even we can decently agree that top down causation should be defined as whole to part causation, but Clayton, has to explain, how these events in the biological sphere do, in fact, exercises such kind of causal power rather than just saying, “The case(s) that support strong emergence are those in which it is meaningful to speak of whole-to-part of the systemic causation.”[19]

The difficult is parallel to how scholars have been baffled by the Hard Problem of Consciousness. As Clayton has concluded, the problem is not that we cannot explain it with scientific terms, through different experiments from Neuron-Biology, we can “describe” what it is and provide a scientific definition for it; nonetheless, we fail to fill the explanation gap between first person experience (begin conscious) and the third person description. The fundamentally physical world seems leaving no room for the irreducible qulia experiences; nonetheless, most scholars believe, it is quite obvious that any individual who dig into the problem is experiencing these properties. In his works, Clayton has tried to relate the thesis of emergence with the findings from the natural world, chiefly the biological spheres, even granting the position of Weak Emergence is in fact true; Clayton still has to fill the gap between how the emergence phenomenon have exhibited top down causations. As I have repeatedly suggesting, merely defining what top down causations is cannot support the existence of top down causations; so unless Clayton is going to further clarify on how these findings can be regard as examples of top down causation and how we should read these examples as exhibiting top down causations, it is reasonable to conclude that the example he has cited do not support top down causations.

Secondly, it appears to me that, evidence by his approach in different works, Clayton might have been confused between the concepts of causal explanations and causal power; being able to explain a certain action does not necessary mean the explanation express causal powers. I think the confusion, as I shall argue later, lead Clayton to conclude the insufficient of Physics. The conflict is more complex than I can evaluate here[20]; for the sake of present purpose, we can simplify the arguments. Suppose there is an emergent event X.

1. X is explained by Biological theory Y.

2. X cannot be explained by or reduce to any other lower levels scientific spheres.

3. Thus, only Y can explain X .

So here we have to ask, what does Y implies? There are at least two ways to interpret the situation in contemporary literature, firstly, Functional Reductionist, for instance Ned Block[21], will suggest Y is a functional explanation of X, the explanation Y or the explanation of the property Y (of being X) is casually epiphenomenal, Y does not exhibit any causal power for it is a functional secondary property.[22] On the contrary, to Clayton, Y suggests that, since it cannot be explained by lower level scientific spheres and neither it can reduce to lower levels, the explanation itself is an evidence for top down causation and so the property Y is casually efficacious. Put things otherwise, Clayton has to show. It might be true that, for instance X is a phenomenon that a certain spicy has been changing their skin color, that knowing the parts do not predict and explain the changes, while a biological explanation suggest that the changes is a result of the environment not simply emerge from the spicy. So the certain spicy has changed the color is subjected to the environment; however, what does the environment has to do with the changes? What are the causations between the emergence of the changes with its micro-physics property, the macro-physics property and the environment?[23] If Clayton wants to make the case for top down causation he shares the burden in explaining these relationship, again, Clayton has examined none of these.

For sure, one might wonder why don’t the Functional Reductionists also share the same burdens in explaining their thesis? In fact, they did and I believe in most cases their position has been well defended; motivated by their ontological positions, for instance the causal closure of physical, bottom up causations, micro-physics properties and so on, they have at least postulated a picture that why we can understand Y as a functional secondary property of X. However, unlike the Functional Reductionists, Clayton has given up too many ontological positions[24] (mostly on false grounds) because he believes, in doing Philosophy of Biology/Science, scientific findings prior to metaphysical positions[25]. As a result, he has been using the empirical phenomenon in prescribing his metaphysical position, but unless these empirical evidences are univocal, then once again, Clayton cannot take these evidences as uncontroversial and function as arguments for his positions.

Clayton might also reply that, since there is no strict law for emergence[26], there is also no strict law for top down causation. However, this is not helping, because, yes, we can propose that each emergent property express unique causal power, so properties are pluralistic; but, it does not mean we cannot find similarities in forming rules among how these pluralistic properties express top down causations. Put things otherwise, properties are pluralistic or dualistic is not our concern here, our concern is, how top down causation is possible regarding the finding from the biological domain and what do these events point to and what do top down causations do.

To sum up, Clayton has failed to provide evidence for top down causation from two different angles; as a result, the validity of EM is in question. If EM’s success or failure is base on its capability in explaining top down causation and mental causation, since Clayton’s proof is circular, so it is reasonable for us to conclude that his further agenda on mind as one of the special emergent events and divine action’s possibility is inductively very weak.[27] However, in the due time I shall argue, EM is a token of NRP and as a result Kim’s closure argument, which argues top down causation is possible IFF we can find a counter argument against it. Since Clayton has basically by pass the argument because he has abandoned the causal closure of physical with false grounds. He has wrongly suppose the causal efficacious of the minds is unproblematic and can understood by common sense, like he has commented in his later work,

Because the approach is emergentist (Strong Emergentist with top down causation) and not reductionist, it is willing and able and take humans’ first personal experience of their own agency into account. We know ourselves to be agents… As soon as the prejudice that underlies physicalistic theories of the mental is removed (the Exclusion arguments etc), then it is natural for one to apply these sorts of knowledge in support of one’s of the second- and third-personal encounters that one experience in the world.[28]

4. Misinterpreting Physicalism

I believe, as I have argued above the validity of EM is strongly dependence on the validity of top down causation; if there is no top down causation, strictly speaking, there is no EM. In the last part, I have suggested that Clayton does not have convincing grounds to conclude those scientific discoveries yield top down causations; however, I believe the fail of Emergent Monism is a result of his ontology rather than just its methodology, it is because, Clayton has misunderstood Physicalism, he has abandon the causal closure of physical falsely, so he has also fail to recognize that EM should best be understood as a NRP and as a result, EM has to explain how the existence of top down causation is metaphysically possible.[29]

Although quantum physics offers the first constraining condition in evolution, there are clearly constraining and determining factors at other levels in the natural world besides micro-physics. Since these other factors influence the outcomes of processes in the world in a counterfactual fashion (had they not existed, the outcomes would have been different), there is no reason not to speak of them as actual causes. But as long as they are defined by laws and causal networks at a variety of different levels, one is not justified in privileging a physical interpretation over all other. For this reason Strong Emergentist prefer the term Monism over the term Physicalism.[30]

At the mean time, let’s not worry about the top down causations at different levels. Clayton believes Physicalism implies Reductive Physicalism, which all physical events can be reduced then explained by Physics. So when explaining Mary’s desire of drinking orange juice from apple juice, Psysicalists have to look for bridge laws reducing human desires to Psychology, to Biology and so on until it is explained in terms of micro-physics. As long as such reduction is impossible, Clayton has further argues the inadequate of Physicalism.[31] The problem here is that, Clayton has simply attacked a straw man. Many Physicalists, especially NRP do not endorse the thesis on reduction, thus NRP.[32] To many scholars in the field of Philosophy of Mind, the minimal requirement for Physicalism is not reduction but the notion on weak supervenience[33]:

Weak Supervenience: Higher level properties dependence on a lower level base property yet irreducible to the lower level base.

For instance, if virtue is weakly supervenience on a man Socrates, changes of the virtue must entail changes of Socrates but not vice versa. While if mental properties are weakly supervenes on biological properties, changes of the mental properties must entail changes of biological properties but not vice versa. So weak superveneince entails that, there are at least 2 tokens in the type physical substance, a higher level one (mind) that supervenience on the lower level one (body). Thus, it is wrong for Clayton in simply assumes, but without arguing how Physicalism = Reductive Physicalism.

Furthermore, Clayton believes Monism is a more neutral word than Physicalism.[34] Because Clayton is a believer of the limitation of Physics, base on his view, there exist “some entities” that Physics is insufficient to explain.[35] Clearly, Clayton does not mean something non-physical like the non-spatial mind or soul; rather, he is proposing that there are entities that should be explained “outside” the domain of Physics. Thus he said:

Reality is ultimately composed of one basic kind of stuff. Yet the concepts of physics are not sufficient to explain all the forms that this stuff takes- all the way it comes to be structured… We should not assume that the entities postulated by physics complete the inventory of what exists.[36]

It is then reasonable for us to question, “What are the entities other than Physics has postulated?” As Natural Science has repeatedly suggested since the Enlightenment, there is only one kind of substance, substance that constituted by basic physical particles, and there seems no room for something non-physical. Here, I believe Clayton is going to reply something close to these: emergent properties/objects are irreducible and casually efficacious, so we can view them as a new token of the monolithic substance. However, rather than explaining what it is, replacing Monism over Physicalism does not explain anything, but, just make things vague and unclear. Suppose, we want to ask what kind of substance a brain is, we know it is constituted by basic physical particles and let’s suppose for the sake of argument, the existence of the brain is a result from evolution history and the brain is causally efficacious that we postulated through Evolutionary Biology. (The properties of the brain is causally influencing in its own right) So base on Clayton, the brain is a decent candidate for the thing that has not been postulated by Physics. (It is postulated by Evolutionary Biology.)[37] So what is the answer? Is the brain a physical substance or a monolithic substance? I believe there is no problem in saying that the brain is a physical substance; on the contrary, if I answer the brain is a monolithic substance, I have to explain what do I mean by that, do I mean it is non-physical? Or do I mean it is something not physical yet is made up of physical particles? The point here is that, we do not know what Monism implies besides: Monism is equals to an ontological position that a world is monolithic in substance, which is tautological in itself. So unlike Clayton has proposed, Monism is not more neutral than Physicalism, unless there is a better definition on what exactly does Clayton mean by entities postulated other than Physics and what the one kind of stuff that all substance belongs to. Monism can just refer to a vacuum that points to nothing particular; as a result, Physicalism is still more decent than Monism in prescribing the world that is monolithic yet fundamentally physical.

5. Abandoning the causal closure of physical

The forgoing discussion about Clayton’s understanding to Monism and Physicalism, as I believe has lead us to the main reason that Emergent Monism has failed to explain top down causation and mental causation. In replacing Monism over Physicalism, Clayton argued, “Kim is right that emergentist, in any meaningful sense of the term- must give up the principle of the casual closure of physical.”[38] Following Kim, I shall define the causal closure of physical as,

The casual closure of physics: If a physical event has a cause at t, there is a physical cause at t.

Before explaining the causal closure of physical, I have to point out that, according to Kim, Emergentism is a kind of NRP, which should not abandon the causal closure of physical without good grounds as,

To deny this principle would in effect amount to denying the in-principle completability of theoretical physics; that is, it would be equivalent to the assertion that an ideally complete physical theory will not be able to give an account of all physical phenomenal (let alone all phenomena), and that to explain some physical phenomena, physical theory must resort to non-physical causal agents. If you are an emergentist, you must make your position clear on this issue of physical causal/explanatory closure, you must either provide sufficient and compelling reasons for rejection of the closure principles or else show that downward causal efficacy of irreducible emergent properties is consistent with physical causal closure.[39]

From Clayton’s work, besides the paragraph I have quoted above, Clayton has never explicitly suggested why he has given up the principle. So following Kim, I shall ask, to make sense of Emergent Monism, Clayton has to either support how he can give up the thesis with sound arguments or retain the thesis and argue how top down causation is consistent with the thesis.

For sure, one might argue, Kim’s warning is overwhelming, since the principle is not a scientific theory or law, but a metaphysical philosophical assumption, as a result Clayton can fairly ignore his warning and move on. It is a fair response, thus, I have to explain the importance of the principle in more detail. It is true that the principle is not a scientific theory or law; nevertheless, I believe the logic of the principle is parallel with our understanding to our universe. Contingently, as Clayton has agreed, the universe is monolithic, it exists only one type of substance, to avoid ambiguity, let’s call it X. Now, an event of X is caused and we want to examine what caused the event; what information should we look for? I think it is rational to conclude, since we believe in the monolithic of X, we are not finding anything other than X(ish) to explain the phenomenal; furthermore, since it is not uncaused it must be caused by something X(ish), we shall then stick to the monolithic causal closure

The causal closure of monolithic: If a monolithic X(ish) event has a cause at t,
there is a monolithic X(ish) cause at t.

That means to say, in either case, call it causal closure of physical or monolithic is just the same; if one believes that our world is made up of one kind of substance, the position is the most rational attitude towards how we are doing scientific research, especially on the investigation of fundamental substances. So if someone is giving up this attitude, one is obligated in explaining why, for instance, most SD denounce the principle and believe that there exist causal substances other than the one substance. However, as Clayton himself has argued, such presupposition, a presupposition that deviate one-self from scientific research is the main result that leads to the fall of SD.[40]

However, I believe Clayton might still propose, as I have evaluated above, that entities at higher levels do exhibit unique irreducible causal power distinct from lower levels; so the explanation of these higher level emergent objects should be explained upward than downward.[41] Despite Clayton has not make a case on top down causation, the principle itself, has only entailed that the physical domain has to be casually closed, if things are caused it is caused by an X(ish) cause, it does not deny the possibility that some phenomenal at the higher level might exhibit irreducible secondary property that demands explanations at a higher level. As a result, if Clayton wishes to give up the principle, merely quoting Kim’s comment (which in my opinion is not Kim’s intention) and suggest since X has suggested that Emergentist should give up Y, Emergentist should give up Y is not helping.

I believe one of the main reasons that constitute Clayton in giving up the principle without providing reasons is that: as suggested in the last part, Clayton believes Monism is very different from Physicalism, being monolithic is very different from being physical, thus, it is reasonable in concluding that the principle for Physicalism does not apply to Monism. Nonetheless, unless Clayton has provide more information on how Monism is different from Physicalism, including NRP; merely, replacing Physicalism with Monism does not justify Clayton’s decision in abandoning the causal closure of physical. Furthermore, as I have argued just now, if Clayton is uncomforted with the use of casual closure of the physical, we can decently replace it with the causal closure of the monolithic and Emergent Monism still has to show us how:

1. There exist only 1 kind of substance, call it X.

2. The casual closure of monolithic has been given up.

3. An event of X call it A is caused at T.

4. A might be caused by X(ish) (from 1) or not caused by X(ish) (from 2).

5. If A is not caused by an X(ish) cause, neither it is caused by something other than X(ish). (from 1)[42]

6. If A is not caused by X(ish), we do not know what is the cause of A.

To sum up, since Clayton has failed to provide any arguments against the casual closure of physical and as I have argued unless we are going to advocate Substance Dualism or a form of Mysterism that we prepare to say we do not know about the cause for an X(ish) when consider it is not caused by X(ish), but the only cause of the event must be X(ish); the principle should be retained and it infers that the metaphysical view of EM, if they want to make senses of a metaphysical definition on top down causation must explain how it exists under the principle. So, to prove EM Clayton has to show how:

A. Emergent objects are physical objects[43], and if emergent objects have a cause at t, it has a physical cause at t.[44]

B. Emergent objects exhibit top down causation.

6. Emergent Monism on Supervenience

Besides, the causal closure of physical, Clayton also questions the thesis of weak supervenience,

Explaining the supervenience of the mental on the physical, understood as an example of evolutionary emergence, therefore requires a diachronic as well as synchronic perspective. Mental properties depend upon the entire natural history that caused increasingly complex brains and central nervous systems to evolve, as well as on the physical state on the organism at a particular time.[45]

So does Clayton deny the thesis on supervenience? I believe he has not, since Clayton has replaced Physicalism with Monism and abandoning the causal closure of physical, Claytons advocates an emergentis supervenience, which:

Emergentist supervenience: an emergent object/property is supervenience on a lower level base and its emerging history. [46]

From the thesis of Temporal of EM, I believe it is decent for Clayton to suggest that, to understand how an emergent object/property has been emerged, it is reasonable for us to discuss what has been happening to the object/property.

However, as Kim has explained in his latest work; if we say X is supervenience on Y, and a property of X, X* cause A* at t, it simply means the supervenience base of Y’s property Y* cause A*.[47] Thus, to understand the causation, we only need a vertical understanding of the event. No matter what X was, at the moment at t it is X, as X* causes A*, X* has done all the work. For instance, suppose we believe Consciousness(X*) is a property of our brain (X) which supervenes on a physical substance(Y), if X* cause A* at t, for weak supervenience, we want to examine the relationship between X and Y. Clayton believes something more, to understand how Consciousness causes a desire, one cannot investigate the causation purely from the understanding of the nervous system at a particular moment, one has to consider how Consciousness has come to be. So X is not just supervenience on Y, a physical substance, it ALSO supervenience on B, the process through evolution. To understand X* cause A* at t, besides understanding how X relates with Y, we have to understand how X relates with B as well.

Nonetheless, suppose there is a powerful scientist, not necessary omnipotence but powerful enough to create a similar conscious substance as us out from P. So there are two identical system, X1 and X2 that both exhibit the property of X*, to understand the causation between X* and A*, since X1 is identical with X2, whether X1 is supervenience on B1 (evolution) or X2 is supervenience on B2 (Out from a thing P), what we need to do is to realize the relationship between X and Y. So, to understand how X* causes A* at t, whether X is emerged from B1 or created at B2 is unrelated to our understanding of how X* cause A* at t. I have to agree with Clayton, to explain why X is emerged from B1 or created from B2 is empirically important, if we presuppose human are causal agents who explain phenomenon and seeking for truth; however, strictly speaking, to explain the event of X* causes A* at t, we have to go back to their supervenience base Y, no matter what X was, either it was P or Q, at t it is X and has X* and X* cause A*. The only explanation need is X is supervenience on Y, but not the history B1 or B2.

Here, Clayton might disagree that because, saying X2 is creating out of nothing is metaphysically impossible; it is because, according to Strong Emergence, emergent objects/properties are unpredictable, so the existence of the nervous system is both unpredictable and might not be re-creatable. Let’s suppose Strong Emergence is true, as Clayton himself is aware, the thesis of multiple realization has proposed that the property of X* can be decently realized from different systems.[48] It might be true that to us, our brain is a result of a long evolutionary process; nevertheless, multiple realization suggests that systems with different constituent can exhibit X* other than X, so it is unreasonable to believe that X can only emerge through evolutionary system, it is at least logical possible for someone to create that out from nothing. While, it might also be true that from an empirical perspective, the definition between living and non-living is unclear[49]; however, to differentia X from ~X at t, the time line is not, strictly speaking, important. It might be true, we believe that things do not come out of nothing; nevertheless, in answering the question, how X* cause A* and X* is a property of X at t, what was X before is not important.

So, it is reasonable for us to conclude that emergentist supervenience is a stronger version of supervenience, a position that believes X is dependence on a lower level base Y; we can further agree that emergentist supervenience try to examines besides being supervenience on Y, B is another supervenience base that explained how a thing come to be X.[50] However, we have to be caution that, to justify the causal power, in saying X* does cause A*, barely tracing the time line, as I have shown, does not help one in justifying the thesis. At most, it can just examine why things might have been emerged, while B does not explain how X* cause A*. In conclusion, EM does advocate the thesis on supervenience.

7. Emergent Monism as a token of Non-Reductive Physicalism

Before I can further elaborate how top down causation is impossible for EM, we have to take the stock now. In order to do that, I have to first tighten our use of EM. As I have argued Clayton has called his thesis Monism; however, straightly speaking, EM is a kind of Physicalism, it is because EM, as I have shown, has to assert the thesis that all events have been happening are fundamentally physical. Secondly, if any event, either we call it a biological, psychological or emergent event, if it has a cause at t, it is a physical cause. Thirdly, in explaining the causal powers of emergent objects/properties, EM advocates the thesis of emergentist supervenience, which emergent object/exercise supervenience lower level base and a history of the object, which has no explanation power for the event. So call it EM or Emergent Physicalism or even Emergent Non-Physicalism Non-Naturalism Non-Substance Dualism Monism, if we believe the minimum requirement for Physicalism is weak supervenes, EM has been more Physicalism than the weakest form of Physicalism.

So if EM is a form of Physicalism, what kind of Physicalism EM is? I believe, ironically enough, EM is a token of NRP, which Clayton has largely ignored in his work. EM, if it is a form of Physicalism, it can never be RP, it is because, Clayton has been convinced by the scientific discoveries that many high-level objects are unpredictable and novel, there are no strict laws between lower level to higher level, so reducing the higher level to lower level is not possible. Furthermore, he also believes in the causal power or top down causation of emergent objects/properties, which are supervenience on, but irreducible and non-determined by the micro-physical properties at lower level. As a result, if EM is a form of Physicalism it should be a NRP that advocates both irreducibility and causal power of higher level properties.

However, one might object me of twisting Clayton’s original agenda in purposing EM, for Clayton is to argue due to the insufficient of both RP and SD, EM is a third possible way in handling the mind/body problem, surely, he will not be happy if anyone categorize EM as a token of NRP; nevertheless, I believe through my discussion, I have shown you that: Clayton has to accept he cannot simply replace Physicalism with Monism without explanations, the causal closure of physical has to be retain and he is factually advocating the thesis of supervenience. So if we are realistic towards our discussion and do not want to fall in the wishful thinking fallacy, we have to follow the arguments whenever they lead. And at this moment, to be realistic about EM, at this moment, is to conclude that EM, even having elements that traditionally NRP does not exhibit, should still be viewed as a token of NRP.[51]

8. The problem of mental causation for Non-Reductive Physicalism:

The Exclusion argument

Since the 80’s of the last century, Kim’s exclusion argument has been one of the most discussed counter-arguments to NRP. According to the argument, qualitative properties for instance, consciousness, first person experience or intentionality, are irreducible but casually inefficacious (Epiphenomenalism). From Clayton’s work, it occurs to me that Clayton is one of the very few theologians in Anglo American literature who recognize the strict materialistic consequence of the Exclusion argument. To Clayton, since EM is distinct from NRP, EM is intact from the argument’s threat; nonetheless, if what I have argued is right, EM is in fact a token of NRP, as a result, so if the arguments denounces NRP, it denounces EM.

Kim’s exclusion argument comes with different version, since Kim has been reviewing the argument while dialoging with different scholars. But generally speaking, the argument presuppose three ontological positions:

1. The casual closure of the physical: if a physical event has a cause at t, it is a physical cause.

2. Casual exclusion: if an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause e (unless this is a genuine case of casual overdetermination.)[52]

3. Strong supervenience: mental properties strongly supervene on physical/biological properties. That’s is, if any system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time instantiates M at the time.[53]

We have already discussed the causal closure; casual exclusion is a metaphysical position that suggests a property is sufficient as a cause unless it is a case of over determination. Let’s illustrate with the thesis of counterfactual, suppose we say a bullet hitting into Sam’s brain cause Sam’s death at t, counterfactual implies, if the bullet has not hit into Sam’s brain, Sam will not die at t. So the property, the bullet hitting into Sam’s brain is a sufficient cause for Sam’s death at t. Now, further assume Sam is 105 years old and is having a dangerous surgery at t; we might want to say, Sam’s oldness and having a dangerous surgery might also constituted Sam’s death. However, the casual exclusion will neglect all these properties, yes it might be true that the oldness and the surgery might have causes Sam’s death later; but Sam’s death is solely resulting from the bullet hitting into Sam’s brain at t, the principle exclude any further “explanations” for Sam’s death is necessary.

Mind body supervenience is a strong form of supervenience, it is because it entails how “exactly” does mind supervenience on body. It entails whenever there is a change of mental properties at t, there is a biological/physical properties change at the base where the mind supervenience on. For instance, when we say, Peter experience pain at t, mind body supervenience suggests that a biological properties of Peter ‘s C fiber in his brain is also instantiating at t.

I believe both of the theses are metaphysical convincing, yet, controversial; scholars have been arguing how we should interpret these assumptions and how these assumptions might affect the validity of the argument, while any of them demands an article’s length to elaborate. For the time being, my agenda is to show that EM’s difficulty is: considering EM is a NRP, exclusion argument denies the causal efficacious of top down causation and mental causation, and I shall articulate how EM might try to provide counter arguments for the exclusion argument, if EM fails to provide counter arguments from its position, EM fails to show that top down causation and mentality exhibit casual efficacious. Put things otherwise, I presume, Kim’s argument, even being criticized by some scholars in the field, is still a deductive valid argument, so, if Clayton wants to make sense of the causations, Clayton has to show us how Kim’s argument is fallible. [54]

According to the exclusion argument, all higher level properties instantiating at T are causally inefficacious. It is because, suppose there is a mental to mental causation E happens at T on a physical system S, when we want to say mental properties M1 cause M2; at first, mind body supervenience entails, there is a property P1 instantiates at T as the supervenience base of M1 and a property p2 instantiates at T as the supervenience base of M2. So, M1 cause M2 by causing its supervenience base P2.[55] M1 and P1 can both viewed as causes of P2 and M1 is irreducible or identical to P1, so M1 is not equals to P1. So we have 2 causes for P2, M1 and P1 , under the causal closure of physical and casual exclusion, P2 has one sufficient physical cause P1 at T, and unless it is a case of over-determination P1 is a sufficient cause for P2 at T. Hence, M1 is exclude from the causation. If M1 is excluded from M, it implies that P1 alone has caused P2 and M1 does not exhibit any casual power. Thus, the exclusion arguments entail, higher level properties are epiphenomenal because the lower level base where the higher level base supervenience on has done all the causal works. Here, one might wonder, as intuitive suggest, why cant M1 and P1 overdeterminately or co-cause cause P2?

At the very beginning, since EM believes mental properties are different from physical properties yet both exhibit causal power[56], so there are two causes M1 and P1, to say M1 and P1 co-causes p2 is to say that P1 is not a sufficient cause for P2. However, through counter factual and possible words, P1 is sufficient cause for because, at the closest possible world P2 is not caused at T unless P1 is instantiates at T, while the existence of P1 is independence to M1 at T.[57] So P1 itself is a sufficient cause for P2, if P1 has not caused P2 at T, P2 is not caused. However, one might still argue, couldn’t it be a case of over-determination, which both M1 and P1 causes P2? I think the answer is no, as Kim is right in suggesting that, for NRP, M1 is distinct from P1 yet supervenience or dependence on P1, while for a case of overdetermination, two or more causes’ existence is dependence on the other/others cause. For instance, Sam’s death at T is cause by A’s bullet shooting into his brain and B’s bullet shooting into his brain; it is a case of overdetermination, because counterfactually, at T if A’s bullet has not killed Sam, B’s bullet will, both A and B can become independence cause of Sam’s death, yet overdeterminated at T. [58] However, as we can see the story is entirely different for M1 and P1, in every possible where supervenience holds, M1’s existence is dependence on P1’s existence, there is no M1 unless there is a supervenience base P1. For instance, the feeling of pain cannot exist unless there is an instantiation of a physical base, the activation of C-Fiber for human being, N-System for Aliens and so on and so forth. So, as we can see, M1 itself, cannot be viewed as a cause like P1, the activation of C-fiber or the bullet that hit into Sam’s brain. Put things otherwise, since M1 is supervenience on P1, M1 cannot cause P2 independence of P1 and it implies in worlds where supervenience holds, M1 exists IFF P1 exists. As a result, it is not a case of overdetermination, M1, under casual exclusion and casual closure of physical must be excluded.[59]

Here Clayton might want to argue the argument does not imply to EM because he has a different supervenience position form strong supervenience, which the emergent objects/properties do not just supervenience on a physical base but also supervenience on the history of the object/property. So unlike Kim has suggested the P1 and P2 might not have been instantiated at T when M1 has emerges and cause M2, as a result M1 itself causes M2. However, we have to ask, how? As discussed, since Q is the mind and S is the physical base, even weak supervenience implies, a change of Q implies a change of S, so if M1 is instantiated at T, why hasn’t P1 has been instantiated at the same time? As I have discussed above, emergentist supervenience explains how emergent properties comes to exist, it might be the case that the first E* (consciousness) that ever happens in our universe has experienced 10 billion years of evolution and thousands of emergences, from physical particles, to chemical structures, single cells and so on and finally a brain B that mind C is supervenience on emerges E*; nevertheless, to say E* being instantiated at T and cause M2, what has happened is unimportant, what is important is when E* emerges at T, in our world it entails that some properties of the physical base B of C must have been emerged at T. It is contingently impossible, to say E* emerges out from no where and supervenience on nothing. And the thesis of strong supervenience stays.

The ground works have been laid, according to the closure argument, top down causation is just a myth because emergent properties, even they exist are epiphenomenal, and it is a conclusion that Clayton believes is unacceptable for EM.[60] I believe we should ask, can EM provide a counter argument for the exclusion argument? I believe there are two possible options for Clayton. Firstly, Clayton, in his articulation of EM can choose to by pass the argument because EM exhibits very different ontological positions. However, barely relying on the existence of scientific discoveries, as I have argued above, does not justify these positions. So if Clayton wishes to by pass the argument, Clayton has to show how these discoveries point to an ontological position that is neither Physicalism (NP and NRP) nor SD and which is also not epiphenomenal. Secondly, Clayton can, like many scholars who advocate NRP has done, argue how the three metaphysical assumptions are false and thus the conclusion does not follow. However, I believe, evidence by the discussion above, I do not see how Clayton can deny these suppositions, at least up to the work he has done.

As a result, if Kim’s argument goes, EM is in jeopardy, it is because top down causation is at best epiphenomenal, which means even objects/properties are unpredictably emerged; metaphysically speaking, none of them can exhibit casual efficacious. for every emergent properties E, when we say E1 cause E2 at T, both E1 and E2 has physical bases P and P2, which E cause E2 in causing P2. Furthermore, E1 has a supervenience base P1 at T; under, the causal closure of physical and causal exclusion P1 is the cause of P2, thus, the existence of E1 is purely causally usefulness. To sum up, since EM’s validity rest upon the validity of causal efficacious of emergent objects/properties through top down causation and how the emergent mind is one of the best example for causal efficacious, the charge of epiphenomenal undermines EM; and metaphysically speaking, top down causation is just a fancy word in saying how higher level properties can be casual efficacious, but empty in its content.

9. Conclusion

In conclusion, to be realistic about EM, EM has failed to answer the mind/body problem; it is because, his notion on Strong Emergence/top down causation and how these top down causations can show the causal efficacious of minds are unconvincing. We can view Clayton’s problems from two aspects, methodologically, he fails to explain and prove how top down causation is contingently possible from the latest scientific discoveries; metaphysically, resulting from his confusion on Physicalism, he does not realize EM is a token of NRP which the Supervenience Argument has deductively yielded how top down causations are at best epiphenomenal. As a result, EM has failed to fulfill the promise of being a third ontological position for the mind/body problem and so by reading EM alone, we still do not know how mentality can affect the physical world in a positive way.

I believe we can learn one thing from Clayton’s failure, to make sense of the Divine, theologians cannot simply take agents’ causality as granted, first, we have to show how mental realism is possible.[61] I believe, unlike some theologians in the field believe, for instance, Clayton, Phenomenology does not show us how mental causation (mental realism) is possible, it is because the problem of mental causation is strictly Humean. So telling us what human agent is or has been, I believe to Hume or Kim, is distasteful because it can either suggests, one has been question begging or fail to explain anything. In contemporary Anglo American literature, many scholars have tried to response to the problem of mental causation; however, among theologians, as far as I come to realize, only, Nancey Murphy, J. P. Moreland, David Ray Griffin and Philip Clayton have realized the importance of the problem and try to articulate a decent response. Our situation is worse then 50 years before; in those days, RP and Naturalism were having an upper hand in the discussion; however, difficulties among theologians might have been to argue how in a naturalistic physical world, the existence of Divine is possible. However, the problems of mental causation goes a step further, it strips the concept of human agency. Even RP or Naturalism is false because of the irreducibility of qualitative properties, it entails these properties are epiphenomenal. As a result, the challenge for theologians today, who are living in this fundamental physical world, and still want to discuss the existence of Divine with the findings from science, even just a watch maker who creates the universe and rest or someone who evolve with the universe, we have to first make sense of mental realism. If mental realism goes, human beings are nothing more than conscious machines determined by the purely physical world, we are purely epiphenomenal and purely meaningless.

[1] 48

[2] TBA

[3] 128

[4] Moreland 140

[5] RE 245

[6] Strong Emergentists do not have to assert all emergent properties are causally efficacious; what distinct them from Weak Emergentists is the belief that some emergent properties exhibit top down causations.

[7] 60-62

[8] 48

[9] 49

[10]

[11] 52-53, 57

[12] 49

[13] 66-84

[14] At this point, I think Clayton is right to point out that in conducting research, biologists are having a different methodology from physicists; however, I believe barely suggesting biologist is using method A and have successful Biological results, which physicists who use method B cannot obtain, does not make method A more appealing; it is because, the same logic goes to physicists when they are conducting physical researches. As Clayton himself has argued earlier an emergence theory is convincing if it can explain patterns across different level of science. So here, we have to keep in mind that successful biology findings, that explanations are looking upward from higher level, unlike Clayton has tried to project, does not necessary damage the validity of the traditional physicists view of looking explanations downward; at best, it just provide inductive reasons for us to reconsider our ontological position on where to look for explanations.

[15] 91

[16] 92

[17] 96-97

[18] 100

[19] 100

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23] Clayton might reply that the causal relation is unpredicted, novel through the history of evolution; however, I think the discussion above should have convinced you that, claiming every difficulties to brute facts rather than explaining the thesis, is leading the discussion to a dead end.

[24] For instance, Ontological Physicalism, the Unity of Science, the causal closure of physical and weak supervenience.

[25] I think Clayton is right, in many cases, scientific discoveries shape our metaphysical attitudes, for instance the shift from immaterial minds to one physical substances. Nevertheless, in these cases the finding is less ambiguous and straight-forwarder, the neutral discoveries might all point to a certain metaphysical positions. However, in case of emergence and top down causations, the evidences can point else where; as a result, Clayton cannot just neglect the possibilities that things can be interpret otherwise and conclude since X is explained by Y, Y is causally efficacious, the position demands explanations, for instance how the interpretation of Y lead to the conclusion that Y is causally efficacious rather than epiphenomenal.

[26] Claytons believe the emergence phenomenon are more case to case, their contents are very different, while all share similar contexts.

[27] Clayton has been using inductive arguments in arguing EM, discoveries induce weak/strong emergence, strong emergence induce top down causation, top down causation induce mental efficacious, mental efficacious induce transcended minds and so on. So as I have shown, since Clayton has failed to induce the existence of Strong Emergence, the rest of his agenda fail. But it is worth to point out that, some of his arguments in arguing the existence of divine action, viewing solely, is more fruitful then his proposal on EM.

[28] AS 85

[29] By using an analogy, David Hume has famously argued how understanding causal causations were contingently impossible. His argument on problem of induction, though being highly neglected by scientist is a deductive valid argument, barely providing more scientific evidence cannot refute Hume’s premises and conclusion. However, as different scholars have shown, we can counter his conclusion by other metaphysical position on causation, for instance, counterfactual or possible world. Put things otherwise, in contemporary literature of Philosophy of Mind, as I shall argue in due time, Kim’s Exclusion Argument has basically “blocked” every Non-Reductive Physicalist and if Clayton desires to make sense of top down causation, he has to shown how top down causation is metaphysically possible.

[30] 58

[31] 52

[32] I believe Clayton is well aware of the position of Non-Reductive Physicalism; nevertheless, he has not explained why he has rarely discussed the position, besides at page 124 in Mind & Emergence, he has suggested “Recent criticisms of non-reductive physicalism, particularly those advanced by Jaegwon Kim, raise serious doubts whether any version of physicalism other than reductivist physicalism is in the end coherent.”

[33] Kim Physicalism 13-14 It is worth to note that Kim believes in the position like Clayton, for more about Kim and Non-Reductive Physicalism read:

Ausonio Marras, Kim’s Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism in Erkenntnls: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol.66, no. 3, pp. 305-327, May 2007.

[34] 60

[35] 2

[36] 4

[37] Saying Physics is insufficient in postulating phenomenon, I believe deserve more explanations. It is because, the saying already suppose that the position of irreducibility which is very debatable. Moreover, even for a reductive scientist who believe in the unity of science, can still believe, though there are bridge laws reducing higher levels to lower levels, some phenomenal, especially in explaining the semantics on what is the meaning of an event happens, can refer to the explanations in a particular field on special science, (being a heart as a secondary functional property) it does not mean Physics itself is insufficient. I think Clayton here has wrongly confused casual closure of physical with explanation closure of physical.

[38] 56 I believe Clayton just refers to the casual closure of physical but not the explanation closure of the physical.

[39] RE 200

[40] TBA

[41] Reductionists believe all explanation must be found downward, if an event at level 5 is unexplained one should look for the cause at L4 or lower. While Emergentist like Clayton believes the explanation of the irreducible novel events, should be explained in L6 or higher.

[42] We are talking about cause not explanation here.

[43] It can be physical, yet its properties are irreducible and casually efficacious.

[44] And if I am right, since Clayton has failed to explain and prove the thesis on top down causation, abandoning the causal closure of physical is not just metaphysically but also methodologically problematic.

[45] 127

[46] 124-128

[47] I shall explain Kim’s argument in detail in the next part. For the time being, let’s see how Clayton advocates weak supervenience.

[48] 126

[49] 109

[50] I do not think we can treat time alone as a cause of an event. An event is caused at T, while a process last from T1 to T2. When X* cause A*, the cause is X* but not how X come to have the power of X*.

[51] Among many the pluralistic of properties and explaining the emergence of Consciousness are something we do not see from traditional NRP; however, firstly, these does not make EM distant too much from NRP, NRP could decently welcome property pluralism and explaining of how Consciousness seeks to exist in case story is told physically. (They might even welcome these positions for these entail the fallibility of RP) Second and more important, unlike Clayton has suggested, these elements do not entail that emergent pluralistic properties are casually efficacious, which I shall argue in next part.

[52] Psy 17

[53] psy 33

[54] Here, I believe one might object, why Clayton must have to provide a response to the argument, different people might find different arguments appealing, couldn’t I, have overwhelmed the argument? At the very beginning, as I have argued EM is a NRP and in the contemporary literature, as Clayton himself has agreed, Kim’s argument has make NRP unconvincing; so if EM is a NRP, EM is facing the same difficulties all other NRP are facing. Moreover, as one will see, the argument is a deductive valid one, the conclusion follows the premises and as proposed, two of the assumptions, the causal closure of physical and supervenience, considering our scientific researches are metaphysically indisputable. As a result, a philosophical attitude (I believe it is more than common sense, it is a preference of being a truth seeker) requests us to be serious about valid arguments against one’s position, so EM have to provide a response for the argument.

[55] Psy 44

[56] Clayton believe mental properties are different types of properties form the physical properties.

[57] Supervenience just entails the higher level is dependence on lower level; the existence of lower level is not determined by the higher level, so it is possible that there is no M1 and M2 but still P1 and P2 but might not be vise versa. For instance, M1 is an experience of pain and M2 is a feeling of discontent, P1 is an activation of C-fiber and P2 is an activation of D-fiber; it is both logically and contingently possible to instantiate P1 and P1 cause P2 while M1 and M2 is not instantiated.

[58] 46-52

[59] So in this case, one might want to abandon the causal closure of physical; however, as discussed it is not a possible option, at least in worlds that exhibit similar physical laws like ours.

[60]

[61] However, to be fair to Clayton, in articulating his view on emergence, mind and divine; Clayton has already refrained himself from concluding hastily how recent scientific discoveries necessary point to the existence of divine in any form; furthermore, he has tried to examine the possibility of causal agents before he argues the Divine. But the sad conclusion of EM, I believe rather than showing Clayton is unaware of the problem, it just entails the difficulties in looking for a convincing account for the Divine.

黃色小雞

2011年3月31日星期四

一個有原則的補習老師

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不要想了，受的士司機氣就去投訴的士司機啦！

2011年3月26日星期六

小雞既時間表

2011年3月25日星期五

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2011年3月24日星期四

Let’s be realistic about Philip Clayton’s Emergent Monism

2011年3月31日 星期四